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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
EVIDENCE
Hospital Records Not Admissible to Establish Manner of Occurrence of In-
jury •o Patient
Hearsay statements are generally excluded from evidence because they cannot
be subjected to the acid test of cross-examination. In the case of Cox v. State'
the principal witness for the plaintiff was dead at the time of trial, but the
plaintiff was allowed by the Court of Claims to prove her appare-Itly valid clairmi
by introducing certain hospital records containing an account of the facts as
constituting an admission against interest, and also as constituting a record made in
the course of business under section 374(a) of the Civil Practice Act, since the
injury complained of occurred on the hospital premises. The injury apparently
resulted from an assault upon plaintiff by another inmate.
The majority, relying on Reed v. McCord,2 upheld the Appellate Division's
reversal of the Court of Claims. The Reed case held that if a defendant who has
no direct knowledge of an event adopts a particular account of the facts as his
own it is an admission against interest, but that if he merely states that he was
informed that an event occurred in a particular fashion it is not. The majority
pointed out that one of the hospital records, "the Accident and Injury Report,"
was only an admission that patient Lantz had made the statement attributed to her
and did not constitute an admission by the state of the factual correctness of its
contents. As for the other record, "Clinical Notes", while it purported to be a
statement of fact made by a hospital employee, it was essentially the same as the
"Accident and Injury Report" since it could only have been based on Helen
Lantz's statement, and therefore was not an admission against interest. The Court
further pointed out that the hospital employee who made the second entry lacked
one of the essential elements guaranteeing the trustworthiness of an admission
against interest in that she had no interest in the outcome of the litigation.3
The majority rejected the argument that the records were entries made in
the regular course of the hospital's business primarily on the basis of the narrow
construction of section 374(a) adopted in .Williams v. Alexandef,4 to the effect
that hospital records must relate only to diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment.
The dissent argued that the records should be admissible as business entries
under section 374(a) since one of the primary duties of the hospital's staff was to
investigate assaults by one patient on another and to keep accurate records of such
incidents. 5
1. 3 N.Y.2d 693, 171 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1958).
2. 160 N.Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737 (1899).
3. Reed v. McCord, supra note 2.
4. 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E.2d 417 (1955).
5. Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
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While the majority opinion appears to be generally consistent with
precedent, its position may often result in the exclusion of the only available
evidence, when through the normal course of events the most desirable evidence
is unavailable. Sufficient proof may be at hand, as in this case, to render a decision
morally certain. Surely the report of an investigation conducted by responsible
and impartial hospital employees at the time of the incident is to some degree
credible. Some jurisdictions6 have met such problems by enacting statutes
permitting the trial court under certain circumstances to admit into evidence the
declaration of a deceased person in spite of the hearsay rule.
Presumption of Continuity of Ownership
In People v. Scandore7 defendant was charged with unlawful construction
within a restricted area, and without a permit, of parts of a building.8 At the trial
the prosecution offered in evidence a deed showing defendant as grantee of the
premises in question. Although the deed had been recorded nine years before
the alleged violations, defendant made no objection as to its evidentiary value. On
appeal, following conviction, however, defendant claimed that the deed was
insufficient to prove that he had been the owner of the premises as of the
critical date.
In unanimously reversing the Appellate Division and reinstating the
conviction of the defendant, the Court of Appeals made use of a well-established
principle in the law, the presumption of continuity or, as it is sometimes called,
the presumption against change. This rule is to the effect that once conditions of
a continuous nature are proved to exist, their continuance will be presumed for
so long as is usual with things of like nature.9
The Court reasoned that since a recorded deed is the customary way of
indicating ownership,10 defendant's ownership will be presumed to have continued
down to the critical date." It concluded that it would be unreal to reverse
6. For example Massachusetts' Laws, 1898, ch. 535, as amended, 1920, ch.
233 §65 provides:
A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmis-
sible in evidence as hearsay or as private conversation be-
tween husband and wife if the Court finds it was made in
good faith before the commencement of the action and
upon personal knowledge of the declarant.
7. 3 N.Y.2d 681, 171 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1958).
8. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK §532-11.0. NEW YORK
CITY DEPARTMENT OF PARKS, RULES AND REGULATIONS §60.
9. RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE, §73 (8th ed. 1955). Such a presumption is
far from being irrebutable or conclusive and its strength and duration will be
determined by the facts and rationale which support it. See Maggio v. Zeitz,
33 U.S. 56, 65 (1947).
10. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §384. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §392 provides:
The rules of evidence in civil cases are applicable also to
criminal cases, except as otherwise provided in this Code.
11. Accord: Collins v. Streitz, 95 F.2d 430, 433 (9th Cir. 1938). See Wilkins
v. Earle, 44 N.Y. 172, 192 (1820).
